This piece reexamines the cognitive revolution in psychology, arguing that it reorganized rather than overturned the discipline’s foundational commitments. It analyzes how cognitive models preserved explanatory priorities inherited from behaviorism, reintroduced internal processes under computational constraints, and expanded psychology’s reach without resolving deeper questions about meaning, subjectivity, and interpretation.

This piece repositions Freud as a theorist of psychological meaning rather than a clinician, examining his account of symptoms, conflict, and symbolic coherence. It argues that Freud’s enduring contribution lies in his interpretive model of mind, which challenges psychology’s preference for mechanistic explanation and continues to illuminate how experience is organized through narrative and conflict.

This piece reframes behaviorism as more than a methodological corrective, arguing that it functioned as a moral project shaped by cultural ideals of control, efficiency, and predictability. It examines how behaviorist assumptions continue to influence psychological theory, research norms, and applied interventions long after behaviorism’s theoretical dominance declined.

This piece examines how psychology came to construct the idea of a normal mind through statistical practices, standardized measurement, and population-level reasoning. It traces how normality acquired normative force, shaping diagnosis, research priorities, and institutional judgments, while obscuring the historical and methodological choices embedded in what now appears psychologically self-evident.

This piece analyzes psychology’s historical shift from philosophical and moral inquiry toward system-level scientific explanation. It examines how the discipline’s pursuit of methodological legitimacy reshaped its language, priorities, and epistemic boundaries, and considers what was displaced when psychological phenomena were reframed as mechanisms rather than sites of meaning and human significance.

This piece examines psychology’s foundational epistemological tension between explanation and understanding, tracing its origins in nineteenth-century human science debates and its institutionalization within the discipline. It analyzes how this unresolved divide continues to shape theory, method, evidentiary standards, and the treatment of meaning, causality, and case material in contemporary psychological inquiry.

This essay offers an orientation to a body of psychological writing developed over decades and transferred to this platform as an active archive. It clarifies how the work is meant to be read, not as instruction or argument, but as sustained disciplinary inquiry. The focus is on posture, ambiguity, and the creative vitality of remaining intellectually oriented within psychology over time.